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Abstract: This paper briefly summarises the evidence that Ireland has a relatively high level of
income inequality, which has been rather stable over time and reflects institutional legacies and
choices made in the past. A comparative and over time perspective suggests that modest
reductions in income inequality are achievable within the framework of Ireland’s current socio-
economic model, but bringing it below the (EU or OECD) average may well be beyond the capacity
of that model. The current financial, fiscal and economic crises require very substantial increases
in tax revenue and reductions in state spending. The imperative to close the fiscal deficit provides
a window of opportunity to restructure the tax system in a fashion that is not only more
economically efficient but also more equitable. Another core aim should be to minimise the
number experiencing long-term unemployment and thus the long-term impact of the recession on
labour market careers. Once the most immediate needs of the situation are met, this context may
provide an opportunity to debate fundamental questions about the role of the state, the extent and
nature of social provision and its financing, and the broader relationship between economic
performance, the Welfare State, and the underlying goals of Ireland’s socio-economic policy.  
I INTRODUCTION
T
he onset of deep recession after a decade of unprecedented economic
growth, and the emergence of an enormous fiscal deficit, have brought
concerns about fairness to the fore in Irish public debate. What is a fair
distribution of the burden of closing that fiscal deficit via tax increases and
expenditure reductions? To what extent can or should those who fared best
during the boom contribute proportionately to extrication from the “bust”?
Were the reward structures that emerged during the boom – the differentials
between top executives and average earners, between average earnings and
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occupations – fair, how have they changed, and would we want to restore them
if we could? If a reduction in national living standards is required to restore
competitiveness, should that be shared equally or should certain groups –
pensioners, social welfare recipients, the low paid – be afforded special
protection?
In thinking about these very current concerns, some perspective is helpful
– on where we are, how we got here, and how we compare with other countries.
This paper seeks to provide that background by briefly characterising income
inequality in Ireland in comparative perspective, and sketching out some
explanatory factors. It then looks at current policy choices and how these
might be framed by reference to medium to longer-term considerations and
objectives. While some might consider distributional issues to be over  -
shadowed by the financial, economic and fiscal crises, the paper argues that
they are in fact central to thinking through options in responding to those
crises effectively. 
II  WHY SHOULD PUBLIC POLICY BE CONCERNED WITH 
INCOME INEQUALITY?
We start by considering why income inequality should be a concern for
public policy in the first place. The extensive research literature on the
concept of equality has devoted a great deal of attention to the question
“equality of what?” – of opportunities, welfare, resources, or capabilities, to
mention just some of the candidates advanced (see for example the
contributions by Sen, 1980; Dworkin, 1981a, b; and the survey by Roemer,
2009). Equality of opportunity has certainly come to be seen as an important
social goal in Western democracies, and inherited privilege as in some
important sense unfair. If everyone actually got the same start in life, unequal
rewards might then be regarded as merited rather than unfair – as well as,
from an economic perspective, central to promoting effort and economic
activity (on which see for example Welch, 1999; Glaeser, 2006). It turns out to
be difficult to define and agree on what equality of opportunity and having
“the same start in life” actually means, though, and what factors are
consequently to be considered as fair versus unfair advantages.1 In practice, it
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associated with coming from a “privileged” background, even in societies that
have invested a great deal of effort into doing so. This means that it is also
necessary to focus on outcomes as well as opportunities in relation to economic
resources, while keeping to the forefront that inequalities in resources may be
regarded as fair or unfair, and indeed economically functional versus harmful,
depending on the sources from which they spring. 
Income is a key component of economic resources but not the only one,
with wealth also a central element. Unfortunately, the distribution of wealth
is even more difficult to capture empirically than that of income, which makes
it difficult to incorporate in the Irish case. There have been some cross-
sectional estimates for Ireland (Nolan, 1991; 1999), and the study of wealth
distributions across countries is advancing (see for example, Jäntti et al.,
2008, on the developing Luxembourg Wealth Study database), but we are not
in a position to reliably place Ireland in comparative perspective or assess
trends over time here.
Focusing on income as an indicator of economic resources, then, it is worth
distinguishing between a number of distinct reasons why inequality might be
a significant concern for public policy. The first is that people tend to have
some sense of whether certain income differences are fair or unfair: current
debates in Ireland and elsewhere about the rewards to top executives serve to
illustrate that this is something people care about, at least in certain
circumstances and settings. Views about income inequality and how to
respond to it are complex and difficult to capture and interpret empirically,2
but public policy has to be responsive to social goals, and attitudes towards
inequality per se will influence how these goals are framed. (This is not to say
that differences in inequality across countries simply reflect such differences
in attitudes, for reasons we discuss below.)  
The second reason is that income inequality may be a key factor in
producing or exacerbating a wide range of social ills such as educational
disadvantage, health inequalities and crime, and undermining social cohesion.
There is now a substantial research literature documenting the extent to
which childhood disadvantage underpins poor adult outcomes across various
domains, such as educational attainment and adult earnings (Danziger and
Waldfogel, 2000, Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 1997; Cunha and Heckman,
2007). Heckman’s work has been particularly influential in demonstrating
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positive impact on school achievement and other outcomes that substantially
outweighed the costs. The extent to which such relationships operating at the
level of the individual and household lead to a strong aggregate causal
relationship between overall income inequality and such social “bads” is less
clear. For example, the recent study by Wilkinson and Pickett (2008) posits the
centrality of income inequality in underpinning health inequalities, whereas
Leigh, Jencks and Smeeding (2009) interpret the evidence as suggesting a
relationship between income inequality and health is fragile or non-existent.
More generally, though, Jencks (2002) concludes from his review of the
evidence on the social consequences of economic inequality that these are
sometimes negative, sometimes neutral, but seldom positive. This may at least
potentially provide a rationale for reducing inequality on instrumental
grounds, as part of a strategy for tackling what are universally regarded as
social ills. 
The third reason is that if equality of opportunity is the core concern,
income inequality may well be a key influence. While measures of
intergenerational mobility in earnings and income are available only for a
small number of countries, its variation across these is reasonably well aligned
with the variation in income inequality – with the USA, for example,
registering as having a relatively low degree of mobility alongside high cross-
sectional income inequality. At a theoretical level, one can also point to models
that predict such a relationship, on the basis for example that a more unequal
distribution of earnings and higher returns to education give better-off
parents a greater incentive to invest in their children’s human capital (see for
example Solon, 2004). As the OECD concludes in the recent comparative study
Growing Unequal, the evidence “… is not conclusive but is suggestive of a
consistent cross-country pattern of low intergenerational mobility and high
income inequality” (OECD, 2008, p. 215).
The final reason, which is only recently receiving the attention it deserves,
is that income inequality and economic performance may be intimately
related, that inequality may undermine economic performance, and that in
certain circumstances promoting equality may enhance economic growth. This
runs counter to the conventional notion (among economists) of a straight
trade-off in which more equality can be achieved only be at the cost of less
economic growth or lower living standards. This reflects an emphasis on the
central role of differential rewards in the labour market in bringing forth work
effort and entrepreneurship: blunting those differentials runs the risk of
choking off growth. However, recent theoretical and empirical research
highlights that the transmission channels involved are numerous, including
for example, the effects of inequality (combined with credit constraints) on
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trust. Voitchovsky’s (2009) review brings out that inequality can both facilitate
and retard growth, and that for example inequality towards the top may have
a different impact to inequality towards the bottom. Empirical efforts to
capture the overall effect of inequality on growth covering developing and
developed countries have generally proven inconclusive, while Jencks (2002)
concludes that across developed countries the evidence for the claim that
inequality promotes efficiency is also thin. Krueger (2004) argues that the
degree of income inequality now reached in the USA may be “… too much of a
good thing”, due primarily to associated negative externalities of various
kinds. So from a purely economic perspective there is a clear rationale for
focusing on income inequality, even if we cannot say a priori how much is
likely to be “too much”.  
III  CHARACTERISING INCOME INEQUALITY IN IRELAND
Against this background, where does Ireland fit comparatively in terms of
income inequality, how should we characterise and then seek to explain
Ireland’s ranking compared with other advanced societies and what has been
happening to the distribution in recent years? The degree of income inequality
can be summarised using measures such as the Gini coefficient, Atkinson’s
inequality measure, the Theil coefficient, and the ratio of the 90th to the 10th
percentile (for a discussion see Cowell, 2008). When the most widely-used
summary measures are calculated from household survey data, Ireland ranks:
● 10-12th within the EU-15
● 17-18th within the EU-27
● 18-22nd within the OECD3
Focusing on the most popular of these measures, the Gini coefficient,
which ranges from 0 to 1 and where a higher figure means more inequality,
Figure 1 shows that in 2007 this ranges from 0.24 to 0.38 within the enlarged
EU-27; the average is 0.30 and the median 0.29. The figure for Ireland is 0.32,
so Ireland is clearly above average, but at a level that is similar to eight other
countries (e.g. Spain, Italy, UK, Poland) and markedly below two – Portugal
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Australia, Canada and New Zealand also around Ireland’s figure. 
One regularly reads, in the media and in scholarly publications that
Ireland is one of the most unequal countries in the industrialised world. A
better description would be “… among the rich countries with significantly
above-average levels of income inequality”. The distinction to be highlighted is
between seeing Ireland as sui generis, one of a kind, with a distinctively high
level of inequality attributable to some specific features of its economy and
society, or as one of a group of countries that share a set of institutional
features that – however great the differences between them – underpin their
relatively high levels of income inequality. 
Turning to trends in inequality for Ireland over time, there is some
variation across the available surveys, but broadly speaking summary
inequality measures have been rather stable going back to the late 1980s.4
(One can contrast this with the increase in inequality seen in the UK and the
USA: from about 1980 the Gini coefficient for the US rose by 17 per cent, while
in the UK it went up by over one-third.) This means that Ireland’s position
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Figure 1: Gini Inequality Measure, EU-27
4 See Nolan and Smeeding (2005), Nolan et al. (2000), and the Central Statistics Office’s releases
on data from EU-SILC, most recently CSO (2009). The figures available for Ireland over time are
from different sources and sometimes on different bases, and need careful interpretation; an in-
depth treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper but see Nolan and Smeeding
(2005).
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past quarter-century, insofar as comparative data allow that to be reliably
assessed. Summary measures may mask important changes occurring in
different parts of the income distribution, so one can also look at decile shares
– the share of total income going to those in the bottom 10 per cent, next 10
per cent etc. Figure 2 shows that over the boom years some increase is seen in
the share going to the top 10 per cent, but mostly balanced by a decline for
others in the top half rather than further down the distribution.5
How would one reconcile this with the common belief that inequality
increased sharply over the boom? The first point is that household surveys
may not capture the full picture, and may have particular difficulty right at
the top of the income distribution where the most pronounced effects from
such a boom might be felt. Data produced by the Revenue Commissioners can
be used to estimate the share of total income going to the top 1 per cent, and
estimates in Nolan (2007) show a sharp increase from about 6 per cent to 10
per cent over the 1990s. Even larger increases in top income shares in
countries such as the USA and the UK have been revealed by similar studies
and widely commented on. In the Irish case, though, it is particularly difficult
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Figure 2: Income Distribution: Decile Shares 1994–2006
5 The figures for 1994-95 and 1999-2000 are from the Household Budget Survey, whereas those
for 2006 are from the EU-SILC survey. All these are carried out by the CSO, but EU-SILC data
shows a slightly higher level of inequality, so this comparison may overstate the increase in
inequality from 2000 to 2006.
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authorities from changes in actual incomes – both are probably contributing to
the observed trend. 
Another factor is that even if the distribution is not changing in relative
terms – if everyone experienced the same proportional increase in their
incomes, which would leave conventional inequality measures unchanged –
widening absolute gaps in incomes could dominate popular perceptions.
(There is some experimental evidence that perceptions or views about
inequality often focus on absolute gaps rather than just on shares.) When
incomes are rising as rapidly as they did during the boom, such widening gaps
will be particularly striking.
As far as shares are concerned, though, some of the effects of economic
growth may be less obvious than others. The impact via profits towards the top
may be more obvious than the no less real impact of much lower
unemployment towards the bottom. Another important feature of the boom
was the increase in married women’s labour force participation. While in some
countries this has been concentrated among women married to higher-earning
men, in the Irish case it was as common for those married to lower-earning
men, and thus did not have a disequalising effect on the household income
distribution. It also seems that at least up to 2000 the boom was not
accompanied by the pronounced increase in earnings inequality and widening
gap between high versus low levels of education seen in the USA and the UK
(Barrett, Fitz  Gerald and Nolan, 2002; McGuinness, McGinnity and
O’Connell, 2008). Strong demand for low-skilled employees appears to have
kept up their returns, while increasing numbers of highly-educated, leaving
college and returning from abroad kept theirs down.6 As far as social welfare
is concerned, rates initially lagged behind average earnings but subsequently
made up much of the ground, although not increasing by as much as average
household income boosted by increasing numbers at work.
Data are not yet available to allow us to track the impact of the recession
on income inequality, but we return in Section V to what one might expect the
key features of that impact to be. First, though, we discuss the factors that
may underpin differences in income inequality across advanced countries and
Ireland’s ranking in those terms. 
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Overall income inequality reflects the complex interaction of various
factors: the way earnings are distributed among individuals, the extent and
nature of labour force participation, how earners and non-earners are grouped
together in households, the distribution of wealth and the returns to it, and
“factor shares” – the division of returns between capital and labour. All these
influence the shape of the distribution in one country versus another.
However, what appears to be the single most important factor underlying
differences among rich countries – and the one that is most amenable to
influence via public policy – is the extent and nature of the Welfare State.
The first and most obvious way that the Welfare State influences income
inequality is through redistribution via income transfers and direct taxes –
income tax and social insurance contributions. There are striking differences
across EU and OECD countries in the measured difference between inequality
in income from the market versus disposable income, when transfers are
included and direct tax deducted. For example, when one goes from market to
disposable income the Gini coefficient is reduced by less than 30 per cent in
the case of Italy, Spain and Portugal, compared to 45-50 per cent in Austria,
Denmark, Belgium, France and Sweden. This overall redistributive impact
can be decomposed into the separate effects of income transfers and direct
taxes on inequality, and broadly speaking there is more variation across EU or
OECD countries in the effects of transfers than taxes.7
However, the impact of the Welfare State goes beyond income support to
encompass social provision much more broadly. Overall “welfare effort” is
often measured by aggregate public social expenditure, which also includes
healthcare and housing subsidies. Relating summary inequality measures to
total social protection spending as a percentage of national income, low
spenders generally have high levels of income inequality and vice versa – as
Glaeser (2006) concludes, there is a strong negative relationship between
inequality and social welfare spending. However, social protection spending
alone is not a very good predictor of income inequality (though probably still
better than any other single factor). This is clearer if the set of countries
examined is the EU-27 or the OECD rather than the narrower EU-15. Quite
a few countries have much lower inequality than their social spending would
predict – e.g. Finland or Slovakia – and others have much higher – e.g.
Portugal and Italy. Variations in social spending do not suffice to explain
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nor is higher social spending guaranteed to produce low inequality.8
The Welfare State remains central, though, because in addition to the
direct effect of social protection spending it encompasses education and
training, the way the labour market is structured and how it interacts with
social protection. It is not simply the extent of redistribution of income at a
point in time that matters, the extent to which higher taxes are used to
develop the human capital of the population and reduce the degree of
dispersion in skills may be key. Institutions (including collective bargaining
structures and broader corporatist/partnership arrangements) also play a
central role in the way the labour market operates to produce more or less
dispersion in rewards given the distribution of skills.
This is where the notion of welfare “regime” is helpful, with the now-
customary categorisation into: 
● Social Democratic – Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden
● Corporatist – Germany, Belgium, France
● Liberal – UK, USA, Australia, New Zealand, Canada
● Residual/“Southern” – Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy. 
These groupings are distinguished not just in terms of how much their
social security systems rely on means-testing versus contributory or universal
payments, but also on the basis of social rights independent of the market,
social stratification, and the public-private mix.9 There are clear and
consistent differences between these groupings in terms of levels of income
inequality, with inequality lowest for the social democratic countries, higher
but still relatively low for the corporatist ones, above average for the liberal
regime with the USA an outlier, and as high or higher for the “Southern”
regime, with Portugal again an outlier. (The former Communist countries of
Eastern Europe cannot be placed in this schema and cover a very wide range
in terms of inequality, from the Czech Republic at the low end to Lithuania at
the other.)10
This lens proves helpful in understanding Ireland’s income distribution.
We saw in Section III that Ireland’s relative position in terms of income
inequality has been quite stable over time, despite substantial variation in
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lowest in the EU-15 in terms of social spending as a share of GDP. That
includes profits repatriated abroad, however, expressed as a proportion of
Gross National Income Ireland is one of the low spenders but not such an
outlier. When social spending is plotted against summary inequality
measures, for the EU or the OECD, Ireland is right on the regression line: the
level of inequality is what one would predict given current social protection
spending. Focusing on income transfers to and direct taxes on households,
their “redistributive impact” in the Irish case to reduce the Gini coefficient for
market income by 32 per cent. This is substantially below the EU average and
similar to Greece and the UK, but as noted earlier countries such as Italy,
Spain and Portugal reduce market inequality by less.11 When this overall
redistributive impact is decomposed into the effects of income transfers versus
direct taxes, it is the former that is particularly modest for Ireland. This
relates in particular to the limited redistributive impact of public pensions,
reflecting their flat-rate nature with reliance on private pensions for an
earnings-related component, as in the UK but unlike many other EU
countries. More generally, though, in terms of the institutional structure of not
just taxation and social transfers but social protection and the labour market
more broadly, Ireland’s structures fit us in the Liberal welfare regime. It is not
then surprising that we have a level of income inequality similar to most of the
other countries in that grouping. 
V THE  IMPLICATIONS
This focus on Welfare State institutions highlights not only the importance
of adopting a comparative framework, but also of a historical perspective on
understanding how we have arrived here, how core features of our
institutional landscape have evolved. A key question then is the extent to
which policy is constrained by this institutional legacy. Is Ireland locked into
a relatively high level of inequality by institutional legacies and choices made
in the past?  
Posing the question that way of course begs what might be seen as a
logically prior one: perhaps we are where we are because that is where we
want to be? Depending on what one believes about the way the political system
translates voters’ preferences into public policy, that could be simply a
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cross-country research on inequality does see it as simply reflecting
differences in attitudes, values and preferences, with voters in some countries
being much less concerned about inequality than others – the question of
interest then becomes why attitudes differ. Without dismissing this entirely, it
seems simplistically reductionist, for at least two reasons. 
The first is that the path from attitudes and values – and their
distribution among different groups in society – to public policy and
institutional change is a long and tortuous one: while most economists are still
happy to infer individual preferences from what people do and spend, it seems
quite a stretch to infer societal preferences from outcomes as complex and
multifaceted as inequality. The second is that attitudes, values and
preferences are not independent of context – they cannot simply be seen as
exogenous. One illustration is the fact that many Americans are suspicious of
“socialised medicine” but are as attached as any European to the public old-
age pensions (“social security”) which Roosevelt’s New Deal succeeded in
embedding during the Great Depression. So while there may be deep-seated
differences across countries in general attitudes towards the state and “Big
Government”, when it comes to the more specific areas in which policy is
actually made there is a dynamic relationship between attitudes/preferences
and institutions/policies: attitudes do not simply shape and constrain
institutional change, they also reflect it.  
Does it make more sense to see societies as choosing different
combinations of inequality and growth – different points on a stable
underlying growth-equality trade-off curve? This is certainly a significant
ingredient in the way public policy is debated. The first objection that will be
raised to most social expenditures is that they will have a negative impact on
economic growth and employment, either directly because they interfere with
the free functioning of markets, or via the distortionary impact of the taxation
required to finance them. Both in debate and in reality this is intimately tied
up with our economic growth/development model – captured in the “Boston or
Berlin” way our choices have been framed. In simple textbook models of supply
and demand, taxes and transfers produce deadweight losses, which hinder
economic growth. However, Lindert’s (2004) magisterial cross-country study of
social spending and economic growth since the 18th century finds little
evidence for such a negative relationship. Recent research has highlighted the
scope for social spending to itself be an underpinning to economic growth in a
variety of different ways. This is most obvious in its impact on the health and
productivity of the labour force, but extends well beyond that to include, for
example, the provision of income security allowing economic agents to take
risks, and helping create an environment where trust and social cohesion are
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percolated through to the way in which the role of social spending is debated
at EU level, including by its Social Protection Committee, in terms of the
potential role of social protection as a “productive factor”. 
The broader relationship between inequality and economic growth has
also been the subject of recent theoretical and empirical research, which has
brought out the numerous transmission channels through which inequality
may affect growth. As Voitchovsky’s (2009) review brings out, this literature
suggests that inequality can either facilitate or retard growth, and that
inequality towards the top may have a different impact to inequality towards
the bottom. What is clear is that some countries have sustained low levels of
inequality with impressive levels of economic growth – indeed, they include
some of the richest in the world in terms of income per head. But realising that
the Welfare State may in some circumstances and respects underpin economic
performance does not mean we can go to the other extreme and believe with
Dr Pangloss that “… all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds”. Just
labeling something as “social investment” does not mean it will have a net
positive impact on economic performance. Poorly-designed welfare institutions
and policies, and financing them, can damage growth and jobs. Countries that
spend more on welfare policies, Lindert suggests, take greater care in
designing efficient taxes and transfers. On the other hand, a central problem
with systems that emphasise targeting of transfers on those who need them
most, as Ireland does, is that poverty and unemployment traps – whereby
recipients have little incentive to increase their earnings – are rife, and
extremely difficult to address without substantially increasing spending.  
VI  INEQUALITY, THE RECESSION AND CURRENT 
POLICY DILEMMAS
While we do not yet have survey data showing the impact on income
inequality of the recession which has replaced economic growth so rapidly and
comprehensively, it is clear that the complex set of channels of influence noted
during the boom is equally relevant in the “bust”. Rapidly increasing
unemployment will have a negative impact towards the bottom of the
distribution – while all occupational levels are being affected, as in the past it
is the less skilled who will experience most of the unemployment. Much
depends on the reaction of migration flows, with the prospects for substantial
out-migration by first-time job seekers and recent immigrants particularly
hard to predict. At the other end of the distribution, sharply declining profits
may reduce the share of total income going there. The return on capital
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and wider ownership of shares and property means that falling investment
incomes have a wider impact than they would in the past – while those
affected are disproportionately in the upper reaches of the income distribution,
some pensioners relying on that source to supplement the state pension will
also be hit. The impact of the financial crisis on the position and sustainability
of occupational pension funds is also a potentially very serious issue for future
retirees. The unprecedented extent of household debt at the onset of the
recession is also a critical factor in its impact on living standards.
Much depends, as in the period of growth, on how the relationship between
incomes from work and social welfare support evolves. The effect of increasing
unemployment and inactivity on household incomes depends on the impact on
the individual incomes of those affected, as well as on the extent to which
joblessness is concentrated in particular households versus more widely
spread across households where someone stays in work. For many older
persons, the level of the social insurance and means-tested pensions is crucial:
again, how this evolves in relation to average income as that average declines
rather than increases will be key to the distributional impact. In the shorter
term, social welfare rates were increased for 2009 in the expectation of
continued inflation but falling price levels have actually been seen over the
past year. Not all prices have fallen uniformly, with the greatest falls in
mortgages, clothing/footwear and cars while prices of some other items have
continued to rise. This means that older people and many social welfare
recipients (who are mostly not paying back a mortgage) have benefitted least,
but the fact that even for them there has been some decline in prices on
average is important none the less. The taxation measures already introduced
to cope with the fiscal crisis brought on by the recession will also have had a
marked impact on the distribution of disposable income. Analysis by Tim
Callan using the ESRI’s SWITCH tax-benefit simulation model shows that the
net impact of increases in social welfare and in income tax in 2009 is to have
redistributed from the top 40 per cent towards social welfare recipients –
though of course those moving from work onto welfare will have lost out.
So, like the economic boom, the financial crisis and the recession it has
sparked will impact on the income distribution through a very complex set of
channels, with the effects varying especially with the sources of income
coming into the household. It will also be impacting on the distribution of
wealth, though once again this will be a complex process. Wealth held in forms
other than housing is highly concentrated, so the effects of the collapse on the
value of financial assets and non-residential property will be felt
disproportionately towards the top. However, this fall on average has not
necessarily been greater than the decline in average house values (at least if
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List” of 25 per cent as a rough guide). With housing the main asset for most
wealth-holders, one cannot, therefore, assume that the distribution of wealth
among those who hold some has become more equal – although the gap
between those with and without wealth has undoubtedly narrowed. Those who
bought property towards the height of the boom with borrowed money and are
now in negative equity, and small shareholders invested only in financial
shares, have clearly been particularly hard hit.
How should policy respond, given the constraints on spending imposed by
the fiscal crisis and with an eye to both short and longer-term distributional
implications? The first point to make is that effectively addressing that crisis
is critically important for everyone, not least for those most severely hit by the
recession. Ireland’s experience during the 1980s suggests that protracted
fiscal crisis and associated uncertainty can delay recovery in economic growth
and job creation. Any expectation that fiscal contraction might have an
expansionary impact on the economy in current circumstances would be
fanciful, but that does not mean that postponing the pain is costless. A central
concern being expressed in current debates about closing the fiscal gap, as well
as its timing, is how the burden of doing so is distributed. The core point to
stress there, though, is that addressing the fiscal deficit is embedded in the
wider macroeconomic challenge, of restoring competitiveness. If one accepts
the analysis that the cost base of the Irish economy has become significantly
out of line with international competition in recent years, and that restoring
competitiveness is the key to medium-term growth prospects, the corollary is
that a fall in living standards has to be accepted in the shorter term to achieve
this. Given the fixed exchange rate regime under which we are operating, in a
time of falling rather than rising prices this requires that nominal incomes
come down faster than prices (see for example Fitz Gerald, 2009; Honohan,
2009). 
This would be extremely difficult to bring about in any circumstances, but
is likely to be impossible if not done in a manner that is seen to be fair.
Fairness might reasonably be expected to entail significant and sustained
reductions in earnings (including for the self-employed) across private and
public sectors, across the traded and protected sectors of the economy, and
across different occupations including the professions. The extent to which
government can influence earnings clearly varies across this spectrum, and
the imperative to close the fiscal deficit means that the public sector pay bill
has to be substantially reduced anyway: the more this comes through
reductions in (real) pay per head, the less the reduction in numbers will have
to be. The minimum wage is intended to put a floor under the wage
distribution, and if the rest of that distribution has to come down then keeping
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that it did not before the recession (see for example Nolan, 2008). The evidence
with respect to the evolution of earnings in the private sector during the
recession is patchy, but does not suggest that reductions on anything like the
scale required from a competitiveness perspective have taken place so far:
leaving the minimum wage unchanged while waiting for those wage
reductions to occur (or become clear in the statistics) may however be
hazardous. As far as social welfare is concerned, some reduction in support
rates to offset the fall in the prices faced by recipients (not that in the overall
CPI) could be justified, despite the straitened circumstances in which many of
these recipients live and the fact that the recently unemployed will already
have seen their incomes fall markedly. (Introducing a carbon tax without
compensation for those on low incomes would be an alternative strategy, in
effect regarding the unanticipated increase in the real value of social welfare
payments in 2009 as “pre-compensation” – as suggested by Callan, Keane and
Walsh, 2009). Looking beyond the Budget for 2010, it would be unrealistic to
think that those relying on social welfare can be sheltered completely from the
decline in national living standards from their artificial peak at the height of
the boom: painful measures in the short term would be more easily accepted if
set in a medium-to-long term framework including the desired relationship
between social welfare support rates and average incomes or earnings.
As well as before-tax earnings, living standards will be hit by the
unavoidable rise in taxation to restore a sustainable structure to a system that
was allowed to become unbalanced during the property boom. A number of
elements which could contribute have been widely discussed, including in the
Report of the Commission on Taxation, and these include a carbon tax, a
property tax, restructuring support for private pensions, and eliminating the
range of exemptions and reliefs that still cost the Exchequer a very substantial
amount in lost revenue. These can be justified purely in terms of reducing the
distortionary effects of the tax system on economic behaviour, but equity
considerations certainly also come into play and add considerably to those
efficiency arguments. It is only if these measures are implemented that there
is likely to be acceptance of the need for those on much more moderate incomes
to pay more income tax by reducing the personal allowances for all taxpayers
and bringing substantially more of those on low income into the tax net: the
income tax base has been eroded both by special allowances and reliefs and by
extension of general allowances and exemptions during the boom, and paying
for adequate public services requires that this be reversed. (The ways in which
a property tax could be structured to protect those on low incomes are
discussed in Callan, Keane and Walsh, 2009, while Callan, Nolan and Walsh,
2007, discuss the scope for redirecting tax incentives for private pension
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taxable, and the administrative difficulties involved cannot be regarded as
insurmountable: the case for a universal payment assisting all families with
children remains strong. The imperative to close the fiscal deficit provides a
window of opportunity to restructure the tax system in a fashion that is not
only more economically efficient but also more equitable. 
The other central focus in ensuring that the response to recession is seen
as fair is the strategy adopted in relation to unemployment. Simply aiming to
restore the economic environment in which job creation takes place will not be
enough, more active intervention is called for. A minimal aim should be to try
to ensure the burden of unemployment is as widely shared as possible, thus
minimising the scope for “scarring” of individuals who then risk being trapped
in long-term unemployment even when recovery takes place. This may involve
not only investing more in activation and training for those at risk of becoming
long-term unemployed, but also providing incentives for employers to take on
these individuals rather than others when vacancies occur. Focusing on young
workers, structured work experience schemes at minimal cost to employers
may have a role, supported and monitored by the state to avoid abuse. For
those made redundant after working for many years, re-training is likely to
provide only part of the solution: Heckman (2000) for example argues that for
older workers wage subsidies may in some cases be a more efficient option.
The experience with incentives for job creation in recession in the past have
not been hopeful in terms of their overall impact on unemployment, but these
may be much less susceptible to deadweight costs if the core criterion for
success is instead that the number experiencing long-term unemployment is
reduced substantially below what it would otherwise be. “Sharing the
unemployment around” may seem like a modest objective but it is an
important one in terms of the long-term legacy of the recession.
While restoring competitiveness and achieving sustainable economic
growth will undoubtedly dominate the policy agenda for the next number of
years, followed by dealing with the legacy of the recession, in addressing those
challenges a longer time horizon is also helpful as we struggle to set and
maintain a course. Renewed job creation is certainly necessary, but there is no
reason to believe it would be sufficient to bring Ireland’s level of income
inequality down to the EU average, if that were a target. In that perspective,
it is notable that countries that achieve a below-average level of inequality
tend to see social protection as part of the solution not as the problem. The
National Economic and Social Council (2005), in its report on the
“Developmental Welfare State”, sought to recast the debate on social versus
economic policy to highlight the intimate linkages between them, and to move
away from the notion that social policy simply redistributes “the cake” that
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is certainly an important ingredient, but has to be combined with effective
social protection – which of course is easier to support when employment
levels are high. The comparative evidence shows that work-friendly social
security is critical, but moving towards a ‘flexicurity’ model requires less
rather than more reliance on means-testing. At the other end of the
distribution, it may be that recent experience has brought about a sea-change
in attitudes to top pay: the notion that the market was appropriately
rewarding the activities involved from an economic perspective seems even
less plausible now than it did before the crash, before one even thinks about
fairness. The way these rewards are set, like other aspects of the way markets
operate, is a social as well as economic process open to influence by the state.   
VII CONCLUSION
Ireland has a relatively high level of income inequality, which has been
rather stable over time and reflects institutional legacies and choices made in
the past. The evidence summarised here and presented in detail elsewhere
suggests that modest reductions in income inequality are achievable within
the framework of Ireland’s current socio-economic model. On the other hand,
bringing the level of income inequality below the (EU or OECD) average, much
less close to the lowest levels among them, may well be beyond the capacity of
that model. The current financial, fiscal and economic crises have to be
addressed as a matter of extreme urgency, and will require very substantial
increases in tax revenue and reductions in state spending. The imperative to
close the fiscal deficit provides a window of opportunity to restructure the tax
system in a fashion that is not only more economically efficient but also more
equitable – and that may be essential in ensuring its acceptability. The other
central focus in ensuring that the response to recession is seen as fair is the
strategy adopted in relation to unemployment: a core aim should be to
minimise the number experiencing long-term unemployment and thus the
long-term impact on labour market careers. Once the most immediate needs
of the situation are met, like the mid-1980s this context may provide an
opportunity to debate fundamental questions about the role of the state, the
extent and nature of social provision and its financing, and the broader
relationship between economic performance, the Welfare State, and the
underlying goals of Ireland’s socio-economic policy.  
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